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Abstract 
The literature on Turkey-European Economic Community/Union (EEC/EU) relations scrutinises how various 
EEC/EU actors vacillate on Turkey’s accession to European integration contingent upon their image/s of Turkey. 
Turkey’s own wavering vis-à-vis EEC/EU, however, is almost always explained with reference to its domestic 
dynamics (political and economic ups and downs) but not Turkey’s policy-makers’ image/s of the European 
Community/Union. What often goes unacknowledged is that throughout the history of Turkey-EEC/EU relations, 
Turkey’s policy-makers’ discourses have oscillated between representing EU/rope as a source of inspiration and a 
source of anxiety. Contra those readings of Turkey’s relations with EU/rope as revolving around the dichotomy of 
‘Turkey being European/not’, our analysis of Turkey’s policy-makers’ discourses on EEC/EU at key moments of 
the relationship during 1959-2004 shows that Turkey’s policy-makers’ representations of EU/rope are structured 
around three binaries that give away a persistent ambivalence vis-à-vis EU/rope as a source of and a solution to 
Turkey’s insecurities. Such ambivalence, in turn, is not uncharacteristic of post-colonial encounters. 
Keywords: European Union, Turkey, post-colonialism, ambivalence 
1. Introduction 
The literature on Turkey-European Economic Community/Union (EEC/EU) relations scrutinises how various 
EEC/EU actors vacillate on Turkey’s accession to European integration contingent upon their image/s of Turkey 
(Buzan & Diez, 1999; Krieger, 2006; Müftüler-Baç & McLaren, 2003; Rumelili, 2004). Turkey’s own wavering 
vis-à-vis EEC/EU, however, is almost always explained with reference to its domestic dynamics (political and 
economic ups and downs) (Öniş, 2003; Rumford, 2002; Uğur, 2004) but not Turkey’s policy-makers’ image/s of 
the European Community/Union (Note 1). What often goes unacknowledged is that throughout the history of 
Turkey-EEC/EU relations, Turkey’s policy-makers’ discourses have oscillated between representing EU/rope as a 
source of inspiration and a source of anxiety. 
Contra those readings of Turkey’s relations with EU/rope as revolving around the dichotomy of ‘Turkey being 
European/not’ (see, for example, Çalış, 2001; Dağı, 2001; Kösebalaban, 2007) – we argue that Turkey’s 
policy-makers’ discourses are structured around three binaries that do not revolve around a single dichotomy as 
such. These binaries are drawn from our analysis of Turkey’s policy-makers’ discourses on EEC/EU at key 
moments of the relationship during 1959-2004. Throughout the years, Turkey’s policy-makers have represented 
EU/rope (Note 2) both as a basis of and an answer to Turkey’s diplomatic, economic and political insecurities:  
Binary 1: EU/rope as insurance against/source of the risk of diplomatic isolation vis-à-vis the International 
Society (B1a/B1b) 
Binary 2: EU/rope as booster of/ hindrance against Turkey’s economic development (B2a/B2b) 
Binary 3: EU/rope as a community of values that is accepting/rejective of Turkey (B3a/B3b) 
In what follows, we argue that the notion of ambivalence best describes Turkey’s policy-makers’ stance vis-à-vis 
Europe; that such ambivalence can be traced back to early Republican leaders’ (Note 3) encounters with the 
International Society; and that notwithstanding post-1999 advances in Turkey-EU relations, Turkey’s 
policy-makers continue to represent the EU/rope as a source of inspiration and anxiety.  
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2. Ambivalence in Turkey’s Foreign Policy Discourses: Inspiration/Anxiety 
What is meant by ambivalence is the in-between bearing of Turkey’s policy-makers as they speak of EU/rope. In 
Post-colonial Studies, ambivalence is understood to be a product of not a mere moment of indecisiveness but the 
very nature of the relationship between the coloniser and the colonised. The latter mimics the former in the 
attempt to preserve the self but the end-product is – in Homi K. Bhabha’s (1984, 1994) words –  ‘almost the 
same, but not quite’. In turn, the former wants the latter to be similar but not to the extent that s/he would 
demand equal treatment. Ambivalence as such characterises the relationship of wanting to be ‘similar’ and 
producing ‘hybridity’; fearing the absence of ‘sameness’ and remaining ‘different’ nevertheless. 
L.H.M. Ling’s (2002) analysis of West-Asia relations is particularly insightful here. In her book entitled 
Postcolonial International Relations: Conquest and Desire between Asia and the West, Ling shows how ‘Western’ 
– ‘Asian’ relationship is characterised by ‘conquest’ and ‘desire’. While the developed West conquers the 
developing Asia, it at the same time desires the latter in that it wants Asia to be dependent. Asia, in turn, ‘burns 
with its own dreams of conquest and desire’ (Ling, 2002, p. 17). What Ling is particularly interested in is 
‘postcolonial learning’ that grows through these ambivalent encounters. She writes:  
Unfolding postcolonially, learning stems from the interstices of power, where Self and Other 
collide, overlap, and contradict. Only the powerless encounter these interstices most 
painfully…Simulation and mimicry of the powerful, then, become the most direct means of 
survival despite their self-denying, self-humiliating implications. But through postcolonial 
learning, the powerless eventually learn to reconcile, synthesize, and hybridize across 
opposing systems, thereby turning an irrational imposition of power into a rational 
mechanism for survival and, possibly, prosperity (Ling, 2002, p. 18). 
Following Ling, we offer a reading of Turkey’s policy-makers’ bearing toward EU/rope as ambivalence – inspired 
by the West yet anxious about it all the same.  
Perhaps because the Ottoman Empire escaped being colonised (Note 4), insights gleaned from Post-colonial 
Studies are rarely sought in the study of its international relations. Yet they prove useful in understanding Turkey’s 
policy-makers’ stance toward EU/rope as a source of inspiration and a source of anxiety. At the time of its founding, 
Turkey’s Republican leaders were both inspired by and anxious about Europe. The former aspect of their stance is 
well-articulated in the literature (Heper, Öncü, & Kramer, 1993). As regards the latter aspect, Turkey’s Republican 
leaders came from a long line of Westernizing reformers who desired to benefit from the fruits of the 
Enlightenment and sought to emulate the successes of the nation-state model. Yet they also were anxious about 
Europe in so far as they felt they had a difficult choice between joining the International Society by fulfilling its 
requirements (Bull & Watson, 1985; Watson, 1992) or risk losing full sovereignty and/or independence. While the 
Ottoman Empire had officially been integrated into the International Society since 1856 (Naff, 1984; Yurdusev, 
2004), the capitulations remaining in place suggested that the Empire was still not treated as an equal (Note 5). 
Having observed (if not come to the brink of experiencing) how falling short of meeting the standards of 
civilisation had proven costly for colonised peoples, Turkey’s policy-makers had become anxious of European 
great powers’ ambivalence toward Ottoman status inside/outside International Society.  
At the time of its founding in 1923 the Republic of Turkey was in need of recognition as an equal by the European 
great powers, thereby removing the grounds for intervention and making room for sovereign development (Note 6). 
This latter aspect of Turkey’s policy-makers’ stance toward Europe remains relatively untouched by the literature 
on Turkey’s international relations. The kind of insecurities European great powers generated for Turkey were 
non-military and non-specific (Note 7). Turkey’s insecurities were non-military in that the gains of the National 
Struggle had been sealed through the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). However, while Lausanne had reaffirmed 
Turkey’s hard-won sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, the Republican leaders were nevertheless 
concerned about the fragility of such recognition. Turkey’s insecurities were non-specific in that they did not 
stem from the specific act of a specific counterpart. Rather, Turkey’s policy-makers represented their actions as 
responses to what the future may bring, based on their particular remembrances of the past and interpretations of 
the present. From the perspective of early Republican leaders, Westernization was not only a life-style choice. It 
was also more than a significant part the Republican project of emancipation. It was a crucial aspect of the strategy 
of seeking security in the face of a Europe that had, in the past, refused equal treatment to the Ottoman Empire by 
virtue of its apparent lack in terms of the standards of civilisation. In the early Republican period, Westernisation 
did not only help Republican leaders achieve their Enlightenment ideas and ideals in Turkey but also helped 
Turkey to meet the standards of civilisation. This, in turn, allowed Turkey’s leaders to claim the right to be treated 
equally and with respect (Note 8). 
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Two caveats are in order here: First, this is not to reduce Turkey’s modernisation and/or Westernization to seeking 
‘similarity’ (understood in the everyday sense of the term), but to underscore the parallels in the experiences of 
various peoples around the world in their encounters with the International Society. Far from the ‘benevolent’ 
image projected in the English School literature, the International Society was a source of anxiety for a broad range 
of non-European actors who faced unequal treatment (if not colonisation) if and when they were found to be 
lacking in terms of the standards of civilisation (Suzuki, 2005, 2009). Second, the point made here is different from 
the one frequently made in the literature regarding Turkey’s foreign policy legacy, i.e. the first President of the 
Republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s mistrust of European diplomacy. Atatürk is quoted to have said, in the early 
years of the National Struggle (1919-22), that ‘our nation’s fault is to have manifested over-confidence in the 
honesty of Europe’ (Note 9). While such mistrust has been explained with reference to Atatürk’s foreign policy 
stance of ‘no total confidence in friends or the outer world’ (Note 10), the productive tension between seeing 
EU/rope both as an inspiration and a source of anxiety is better captured by the notion of ambivalence. 
In what follows, the article traces the trajectory of Turkey’s policy-makers’ representations of EU/rope since 1959. 
Our analysis focuses on key moments of the Turkey-EEC/EU relationship (Note 11). These key moments are: 
Turkey's application to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959; the Ankara Agreement of 1963 
which established a partnership with the perspective of realizing a customs union; the signing of the Additional 
Protocol in 1970; Turkey’s 1978 demand to suspend its obligations originating from the Protocol; Turkey's full 
membership application in 1987; the signing of the Customs Union Agreement in 1995; the 1997 rejection of 
Turkey’s candidacy and Turkey’s decision to suspend political dialogue with the EU; the European Union’s 
recognition of Turkey as a candidate country in 1999; and the 2004 EU decision to begin accession negotiations 
(Note 12). Altogether they show that Turkey’s policy-makers’ representations of EU/rope do not revolve around a 
single dichotomy (Turkey being European/not) but are structured in three binaries. The complex way in which 
these representations are employed by Turkey’s policy-makers give away a persistent ambivalence vis-à-vis 
EU/rope as a source of and a solution to Turkey’s insecurities. Such ambivalence, in turn, is not uncharacteristic of 
post-colonial encounters. 
3. Turkey Applies to Join the European Economic Community (1959) 
The European Economic Community has its origins in the post-World War II collaboration of Jean Monnet and 
Robert Schuman who jointly devised a plan for a European common market primarily in coal and steel, two staples 
of the arms industry, toward preventing a repetition of the experiences of the two devastating wars of the first half 
of the 20th century. In 1950, they presented the plan to the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. The European 
Coal and Steel Community was founded in 1952, with Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands joining 
France and Germany. The cooperation between ‘the Six’ expanded during the 1950s and paved the way for new 
areas and arenas of cooperation. ‘The Treaties of Rome’ founded the European Economic Community (EEC) and 
the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) in March 1957. The EEC set up a common market on the 
basis of a customs union. 
Turkey had emerged from WWII in a frail state. While it had remained outside the hostilities and declared war on 
Germany and Japan only toward the end of the War (1 March 1945) its economy and society were adversely 
affected in apprehension of joining the War. Such frailty, when coupled with the Soviet Union’s unwelcome 
post-WWII advances (regarding the status of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits and two Eastern provinces, 
Kars and Ardahan) facilitated Turkey’s decision to seek membership to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and closer relations with the United States (Cos & Bilgin, 2009). By the time Turkey applied for EEC 
membership, it had already joined the Council of Europe (1949) and NATO (1952). 
Turkey’s policy-makers’ discourses on the EEC membership application reveal two representations of EU/rope 
prevailing at the time: a source of the risk of diplomatic isolation vis-à-vis the International Society (B1b) and a 
booster of economic development (B2a). To start with the former, the decision to apply for EEC membership 
seems to have been made in haste, following receipt of the news about the Greek application. Within 15 days of 
hearing of Greece’s news, the application was prepared and submitted by the Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party, 
DP) government. When the decision to submit the membership application was brought to the attention of the 
Cabinet on 30 July 1959, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes challenged his Ministers by saying: ‘Is there anything 
Greece can do and we can’t?’ (cited in Birand, 2000, p. 54). While the PM’s words revealed a competitive streak 
with Greece, it also gave away an element of anxiety, which further crystallised in his Foreign Minister’s 
statements on the subject. Semih Günver, then head of Foreign Ministry’s Office of International Economic Affairs 
and a close collaborator of the Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, related in his memoirs what the Minister told 
him on that occasion: 
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We will at once apply to join the Common Market. We cannot let Greece enter and settle in 
Europe on its own. This is not only an economic but also political affair. If Athens joins the 
Common Market and we don't, it will cause us trouble in the future (Günver, 1985, p. 105). 
It is significant to highlight here that, at the time, the centrality of Greece to Turkey’s policy-makers’ discourse 
appeared to be contingent on Turkey’s anxiety vis-à-vis EU/rope (especially if it were to allow Greece in but not 
Turkey) but not directly associated with bilateral relations with Greece or the conflict over Cyprus.  
Even as they represented EU/rope as a source of the risk of diplomatic isolation vis-à-vis the International Society, 
Turkey’s policy-makers also portrayed EU/rope as a booster of Turkey’s economic development. One of the most 
important foreign policy issues for Turkey at the time was easing the foreign exchange deficit. Indeed the 5th 
Menderes government program (1957-1960) referred to the EEC membership application in the context of the 
foreign exchange deficit. Similarly, on the occasion of a foreign policy speech delivered at the Grand National 
Assembly, the Premier framed the EEC as a project designed to establish a free trade area and make financial aid 
available toward developing the economies of relatively less developed countries of Western Europe (Sükan, 
1991). The implication being, by joining the EEC Turkey would also benefit from such aid. Likewise, Foreign 
Minister Zorlu underscored the centrality of economic concerns to the government’s reasoning when speaking to 
the Press. Zorlu reminded them that concerns regarding the economy were of utmost importance in the decision to 
apply for membership. He said: ‘Turkey is entering to the Common Market in order to strengthen its economy’ 
("Hariciye ve Savunma Vekilleri Paris'e Gitti," 1959).  
To summarize, then, at the time of Turkey’s application to join the EEC in 1959, both Menderes and Zorlu publicly 
represented the issue of membership to EEC as an answer to Turkey’s dire economic situation at the time (B2a) 
while privately voicing their anxiety vis-à-vis the new political formation in Europe (B1b), thereby exhibiting DP’s 
ambivalence toward EU/rope at a time when relations were moving full speed at the European Council (Karaca, 
2010, pp. 17-133).  
4. The Ankara Agreement (1963) 
DP was removed from office with the May 27, 1960 coup d’etat. Following 17 months of direct rule by the Military, 
on 20 November 1961 a government was formed by İsmet İnönü, Head of Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican 
People’s Party, RPP) and former President of the Republic.  
RPP’s representation of the EEC constituted a change from that of DP in that while RPP policy-makers 
de-emphasised the economy dimension, they underscored the political impact of relations. The primary 
non-military and non-specific insecurity of RPP policy-makers was Turkey being excluded from the International 
Society.  Evidence of persisting anxiety vis-à-vis EU/rope (B1b) could be found in Foreign Minister Feridun 
Cemal Erkin’s address to the Grand National Assembly in 1962. Erkin, who had previously served as Turkey’s 
Ambassador to Washington, DC (1948-1955) and contributed to the effort to secure Turkey’s NATO membership, 
said: ‘our main objective is to avoid being left out of the process of European economic integration and ensuing 
political integration. It is not difficult to understand what remaining outside such a process would mean’ (Çayhan, 
1997, p. 40). Evidence of RPP government’s de-emphasis on the economic dimension could be observed in an 
article published in the daily Ulus by Turhan Feyzioğlu, Deputy Prime Minister responsible for relations with the 
EEC:  
more important than the short-term gains of the membership to the EEC, Turkey's efforts to 
become a European state achieved a new victory with this agreement. Turkey's hope to be a 
member does not result from only short-termist and simple foreign trade calculations. With 
this agreement, it is proven in the most precise way that Europe's borders end where our 
southern and eastern borders lie (quoted in Sezer, 1974, p. 522). 
On 12 September 1963 the Ankara Agreement was signed between Turkey and the EEC. Providing that Greece 
and Turkey were not industrialized enough for competing with the economies of the existing members, the EEC 
offered them both gradual membership to the customs union following which they could apply for fully joining the 
common market. On the occasion of the signing ceremony in Ankara, Foreign Minister Erkin gave a speech 
portraying the agreement as ‘unique’. He went on to underscore how the Ankara agreement ‘reaffirmed’ Turkey’s 
desire to become a part of EU/rope and promised ‘peace and prosperity’ in the future ("Ortak Pazar Antlaşması 
İmzalandı," 1963). In his address to the Senate, Prime Minister İnönü reiterated his Foreign Minister’s words: 
‘With this agreement, we think that we have made serious progress in the way towards Turkey's Westernization, 
which was decided by Atatürk as a national policy’ (Karluk, 2003, p. 534). The point being, the Premier and his 
Foreign Minister represented the Ankara agreement as a next step in the Republican project of Westernization. 
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To sum up, elements of DP’s ambivalence vis-à-vis EU/rope were also visible in RPP policy-makers’ discourses. 
They clearly viewed EU/rope both as a source of (B1b) and a solution to (B1a) the risk of diplomatic isolation 
vis-à-vis the International Society. As such RPP of the 1960s exhibited continuity with early Republican leaders’ 
representations of European great powers. 
5. Turkey-EEC Additional Protocol (1970) 
The first 5-year transition period as stipulated by the Ankara Agreement ended in 1968. The negotiations for the 
second 5-year transition period began in the same year. Turkey-EEC Partnership Council held their first meeting 
on 5 April 1968. During this period, single party governments formed by Süleyman Demirel, Head of Adalet 
Partisi (Justice Party, JP), came into office (1965-1969, 1969-1971). Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil 
spoke to the Press following a visit to Germany for negotiations with the EEC and represented the 5-year transition 
period as providing a ‘model’ toward furthering Turkey’s industrialization efforts (Uygun, 1969). In an article 
published in the official journal of the İstanbul Chamber of Commerce in the same year, the Foreign Minister 
reminded the readers that ‘Turkey, since its early reform period and especially since the foundation of the Republic, 
has considered itself as a member of Europe and as a member of the free world’. Çağlayangil went on to associate 
membership to the EEC with this early Republican ideal, thereby exhibiting continuity with previous RPP 
governments. In the rest of the article, Foreign Minister Çağlayangil emphasised the financial benefits of EEC 
membership (Çağlayangil, 1969). As such, Çağlayangil brought together two sets of threads in DP and RPP 
governments’ discourses on EU/rope: namely, EU/rope as a booster of Turkey’s economic development (B2a) and 
EU/rope as insurance against the risk of diplomatic isolation vis-à-vis the International Society (B1a). 
With the signing of the Additional Protocol on 23 November 1970, Turkey acquired 210 (of the original 400) 
million USD loan it sought while agreeing to lower its own customs duties in 12 and 22 year-periods. The same 
could not be said about the opposition, which represented EU/rope as a potential hindrance against Turkey’s 
economic development. The JP government, in turn, while accepting the relevance of the opposition’s portrayal of 
membership to EEC as carrying risks for the economy (B2b), nevertheless cautiously sustained its own 
representation of EU/rope as bolstering Turkey’s economic development and contributing to Turkey’s political 
security. As such, JP (1965-1971) remained ambivalent on economic grounds while sustaining its confidence in the 
diplomatic and political significance of what it achieved in the negotiations. 
6. Turkey Suspends Its Obligations vis-à-vis the Customs Union (1978) 
The 1970s brought change and transformation to the EEC, and political and economic upheaval to Turkey. EEC’s 
transformation comprised of four key moves: the trade agreements with the Group of 77 (a group of developing 
states organized within the United Nations to promote their common economic interests in 1970); the adoption of 
the Global Mediterranean Policy (whereby the Community agreed to some level of trade facilitation in agricultural 
products with North Africa, 1972); accepting Greece in 1976 as a full member of the EEC (and later Portugal and 
Spain, respectively in 1978 and 1979); and the decision to phase out the guest workers’ scheme in EC Member 
States (1974). These developments gave rise to insecurities about political isolation and economic marginalization 
of Turkey vis-à-vis EU/rope. These insecurities were further aggravated under conditions of turbulence in 
domestic political and economic situation. The foreign exchange crisis impeded gas and oil imports and caused 
shortages in many other essentials. The violent strife between left and right wing groups further destabilized the 
country. Between the 12 March 1971 memorandum issued by the Military and the 12 September 1980 coup d`etat, 
eleven governments came into and out of office. Four of these were short-lived coalitions, and two were caretaker 
governments set up to carry the country through the general elections.  
Our analysis of Turkey’s policy-makers during this turbulent era revealed two representations of EU/rope to be 
prevalent: EU/rope as a source of the risk of diplomatic isolation vis-à-vis the International Society (B1b) and 
EU/rope as a hindrance against Turkey’s economic development (B2b). The former representation came to prevail 
at a time characterised by anxiety stemming from the advancement of Greece’s status vis-à-vis the EEC. Especially 
in the aftermath of the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation, Turkey’s policy-makers exhibited uneasiness with the 
progress Greece was making on the membership track. Turkey's foreign policy during this period was dominated 
by the Cyprus conflict and the encounter with USA over the issue of opium production and the arms embargo. As 
the EEC welcomed Greece, Turkey’s policy-makers repeatedly voiced their anxiety stemming from what they 
considered to be a preferential attitude toward Greece (Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 1976).  
The second representation that prevailed at the time was EU/rope as a hindrance against Turkey’s economic 
development (B2b). For example, in 1974, Foreign Minister Turan Güneş (RPP) told the Press that the government 
would ‘take all necessary measures to prevent the EEC from exploiting Turkey’ ("AET'nin Bizi Sömürmemesi için 
Tedbir Alacağız," 1974). Two years later in 1976, the Foreign Minister Çağlayangil (JP), when leaving the EEC 
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Council of Ministers meeting at Brussels, told the Press that ‘Turkey could suspend the Agreement. It is possible to 
live without the EEC. Turkey can live without EEC but in the West’ (Birand, 1976, p. 1). The prevalence of the 
latter representation had its roots not only in Turkey’s inability to fulfil its duties but also the EEC’s transformation, 
which, in turn, meant a change in Turkey’s status vis-à-vis the Community. Having agreed to lower trade barriers 
for EEC products, Turkey was now faced with the risk of losing its ‘privileged’ position vis-à-vis the EEC – the 
very privilege it thought it had secured through the Ankara Agreement. Now that the EEC had extended such 
privileges to others, Turkey’s policy-makers no longer so felt so privileged. Finally, the EEC’s decision to phase 
out the guest workers’ scheme meant that Turkey faced the risk of a decrease in workers’ remittances and, as a 
result, an important source of income. The next RPP government formed under the Premiership of Bülent Ecevit, 
the new head of the RPP, asked for 8 billion USD loan as well as trade concessions from the EEC (Birand, 1978, p. 
6). Following the EEC’s refusal, and during the preparations for the Fourth Five Year Plan, Turkey decided to 
suspend its obligations vis-à-vis the customs union. 
The late 1970s, then, proved to be a critical turning point in Turkey’s policy-makers’ discourses on EU/rope. While 
both political parties’ policy-makers had previously represented the EEC as a booster of Turkey’s economic 
development by virtue of the credits it could provide, when the EEC proved unforthcoming in extending loans, 
their representation shifted to that of EU/rope as a hindrance against Turkey’s economic development (B2b). 
Against the background of Turkey’s policy-makers’ long-standing anxiety regarding Greece’s advanced status 
vis-à-vis EU/rope, representations of EEC/EU as a source of the risk of diplomatic isolation also became prevalent 
during this period (B1b). 
7. Turkey Applies to Join the European Community (EC) for Full Membership (1987)  
The 12 September 1980 coup brought Turkey-EEC relations to a halt. While the EEC did not take an explicit 
stance, the Council of Europe rejected the credentials of delegations from Turkey, which actively prevented them 
from taking their seats in the Assembly (Karaca, 2010, pp. 161-184). In the meantime, the EC was preoccupied 
with two major issues. First, they integrated the relatively less-developed economies of Greece, Portugal and Spain 
into the Common Market. Second, they gave a start to the process of converting the Common Market into a single 
market whereby all barriers against freedom of movement of capital, services, people, and goods would be 
abolished. The Single European Act, which defined the roadmap for the creation of the economic union in Europe, 
was signed in 1986 and came into effect in July 1987.   
1987 was also the year Turkey decided to apply for full membership to EC. Following the return to multi-party 
democracy in 1983, Turgut Özal’s Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party, MP) had come into office. The first MP 
government (1983-1987) applied for full membership right before the general elections of November 1987. As 
with the 1959 decision to apply for EC membership, Greece again factored in the equation. Premier Özal 
announced the application decision to the Motherland Party's Group in the Parliament by highlighting how the 
membership of Greece to EC constituted leverage against Turkey. Accordingly, Özal represented EU/rope as a 
source of anxiety by virtue of constituting a source of the risk of Turkey’s diplomatic isolation vis-à-vis the 
International Society (B1b). Yet he also pointed to EEC membership as the solution to the very problems it caused 
(B1a), thereby exhibiting ambivalence characteristic of previous administrations. 
During this period the European Parliament passed various resolutions on Turkey's domestic and international 
problems (including ‘The Decision in relation to the Political Solution for the Armenian Problem’ in 1987, ‘The 
Situation in Cyprus’ in 1988, and ‘The Situation of Kurds in Turkey’ in 1992). These resolutions were met by 
Turkey’s policy-makers’ representations of EU/rope as a source of the risk of diplomatic isolation vis-à-vis the 
International Society. During the discussions in the National Assembly about the decision on the Armenian 
problem, Foreign Minister Vahit Halefoğlu said ‘the Turkish nation has never bowed under foreign 
pressures...Turkey's application to be a member of the EC will not be affected by such partial, bigoted and 
unbalanced decisions’ (Çayhan, 1997, p. 308). The resolution passed by the Grand National Assembly represented 
the European Parliament as a tool in the hands of those who scheme against ‘Turkey's territorial unity’ (Çayhan, 
1997, p. 313 and 315).  
What was new during the MP period was that Turkey’s policy-makers began to move away from previous 
governments’ stress on civilizational commonality with EU/rope as insurance against the risk of diplomatic 
isolation. Instead they portrayed EU/rope as a community of values accepting of Turkey (B3a) and located the 
grounds of such acceptance in common political values (but not culture or civilization). Consider Foreign Minister 
Halefoğlu’s words spoken at a general discussion on EU/rope at the Grand National Assembly: 
Turkey's membership to the EEC is a natural requisite of the Republic's policy of joining the 
Western civilization...We will join the European Community while protecting our national 
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and cultural values. Therefore Turkey will enrich Europe's political and cultural life. The 
most important shared characteristic of Turkey and Europe is our embrace of pluralistic 
democracy and human rights as an indispensable aspect of our style of life (Çayhan, 1997, p. 
294). 
A short-lived MP government set up by Mesut Yılmaz (June 1991-November 1991) broadened the list of 
commonalities in its program: pluralist democracy, free elections and market economy (Karluk, 2003, p. 702). This 
shift in discourse was significant in two ways. By way of defining EU/rope as a community of values, and defining 
those values in political terms, Turkey’s policy-makers exhibited an awareness of the transformation that EU/rope 
has gone through since 1959. At the same time, by way of seeking to locate that common ground in political values 
alone, MP policy-makers were defining Turkey outside of EU/ropean civilization in a way no previous 
administration had done. Through identifying a source of commonality other than joint membership to Western 
civilization (as previously emphasised by successive RPP and JP governments) successive MP governments 
exhibited ambivalence toward EU/rope on political grounds: The MP government portrayed EU/rope both as a 
source of the risk of diplomatic isolation vis-à-vis the International Society (B1b) and a community of values 
accepting of Turkey (B3a). 
8. The Customs Union Agreement (1995) 
The Motherland Party lost the 1991 elections. The centre-right Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party, TPP) and the 
centre-left Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (Social Democratic People Party, SDPP) formed a coalition government 
led by Süleyman Demirel, Head of TPP (1991-1993) and later by Tansu Çiller (1993-1995). It was Çiller who 
signed the Customs Union Agreement in 1995.  
During this period, conspicuously scarce were representations of EU/rope as bolstering or hindering Turkey’s 
economic development. The government pointed to ‘free trade’ but no other dimension of the Customs Union and 
made little of its potential implications for the economy. Çiller’s coalition partner, Head of SDPP and Foreign 
Minister Murat Karayalçın, in his address to the Grand National Assembly, highlighted how ‘the development 
policies of our country are based on free trade. That is why we are in search for ways to export our products more 
efficiently to the Community: that will be achieved through the Customs Union’ (Çayhan, 1997, p. 436). Çiller, in 
a public address, said there would be more trade with the EU because of the Customs Union, and continued, 
‘Turkey should not pay the price of exclusion in the world which has been parcelled by regional trade blocs’ 
("Çiller'den Haydi Türkiyem," 1995). Considering the challenge joining the Customs Union constituted for a 
Turkey already suffering from a trade deficit and 150% inflation rate per annum, and against the background of 
concerns raised during the 1970s about the potential negative impact of EEC accession on the economy, the 
government’s lack of reference to economic in/security is revealing in terms of the centrality of the political 
in/securities and solutions in Turkey’s relations with EU/rope (Note 13).  
At the moment of the signing of the Customs Union, then, the representation that prevailed was EU/rope as a 
source of the risk of diplomatic isolation vis-à-vis the International Society (B1b) and as a community of (political) 
values that can be accepting of Turkey (B3a). As with previous MP governments, the TPP-SDPP coalition 
government too wrote Turkey out of EU/ropean civilization but sought common ground in the commonality in 
political values.  
9. EU Rejects Turkey’s Candidacy; Turkey Suspends Political Dialogue with the EU (1997) 
The December 1997 Luxembourg European Council meeting resulted one of the most serious crises in Turkey’s 
relations with EU/rope. In the Presidency Conclusions, the Council affirmed Turkey’s candidacy while voicing 
serious criticisms regarding foreign and domestic political matters (European Council, 1997). At the time, a 
coalition government made up of Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Leftist Party, DLP) of Ecevit and Yılmaz’s 
MP was in office. They responded by withdrawing of PM Yılmaz’s attendance to the Conference of Europe, which 
was planned to bring together the Member States and the candidates. Even more stern was the decision to suspend 
political dialogue with the EU. Premier Yılmaz, speaking to the New York Times, explicitly represented EU/rope as 
a source of the risk of diplomatic isolation vis-à-vis the International Society (B1b) and as a community of values 
that is rejective toward Turkey (B3b). He went on to establish a link between the two as follows:  
So we come to the conclusion that even if we meet all the conditions being put to us, the real 
argument against our membership will still be there. The most important decision in 
Luxembourg, I believe, is the construction of a new Berlin wall, a cultural Berlin wall 
(Kinzer, 1997). 
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Asked to clarify what he meant by the Berlin Wall analogy, PM Yılmaz replied: ‘Religious discrimination, of 
course’ (Kinzer, 1997). 
While identifying EU/rope as a source of the risk of diplomatic isolation vis-à-vis the International Society, the 
government went on the assault to counter representations of Turkey not belonging to EU/rope conceived as a 
civilizational project (Note 14). Foreign Minister Ismail Cem was the most active proponent of those 
policy-makers who highlighted the duality of Turkey’s culture including elements from both ‘Western’ and 
‘Eastern’ cultures (B3a). The point being, both partners to the MP-DLP coalition government used the same 
representations in responding to the 1997 decision of the EU: EU/rope as a source of the risk of diplomatic 
isolation vis-à-vis the International Society (B1b) and EU/rope as a community of values that is rejective toward 
Turkey (B3b). Different from previous MP and TPP-SDPP governments, Foreign Minister Cem expressed 
ambivalence in a different way. He did not write Turkey out of EU/ropean civilization by seeking the common 
ground in political values alone. Rather Cem sought to bring Turkey and EU/rope together on a civilizational 
common ground by pointing to centuries of history of enmeshment of civilizations (B3a). Different from RPP or JP 
governments of previous eras, Cem accepted the plurality of civilizations but also highlighted centuries of give and 
take between ‘East’ and ‘West’, which practically made them indistinguishable in Anatolia, he maintained. 
10. EU Recognizes Turkey as a Candidate Country (1999) 
The crisis in Turkey-EU relations came to an end at the 1999 Helsinki European Council, where Member States 
confirmed that ‘Turkey is a candidate State destined to join to the Union’ (EuropeanCouncil, 1999). The 
government at the time was a fragile coalition set up by Ecevit’s DLP, MP and Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi 
(Nationalist People’s Party, NPP) (1999-2002).  
Even as Turkey-EU relations exhibited an all time high, ambivalence continued to characterise Turkey’s 
policy-makers’ representations of EU/rope. To Cem, the Helsinki decision was significant not only for Turkey’s 
future but also in terms of what was EU/rope to be. In an article simultaneously published in several European 
dailies, he wrote:  
The EU is now deciding on its enlargement process. One important decision is what role to 
offer Turkey, which provides Western E.U.rope's main historical, cultural and economic links 
to Eastern horizons. The choice that the EU makes will either provide the EU with a crucial 
bridge of conciliation with civilizations with other characteristics, or will be discriminatory 
and have no effect, or even negative effects on the persisting dichotomies (Cem, 2000, p. 
138).  
As such, FM Cem sustained above-mentioned representations of EU/rope as a community of values accepting of 
Turkey (B3a) and EU/rope as a source of/solution to the risk of diplomatic isolation vis-à-vis the International 
Society (B1a/B1b). This indicates that non-military and non-specific insecurity of policy-makers in relation to 
acceptance of Greece to and exclusion of Turkey from EU/rope was still present in 1999. The latter was 
particularly visible when Cem alluded to Greece in his speech: ‘If the borders of Europe end with Greece, this can 
create problems for Turkish-Greek relations’, he said ("Cem Uyardi," 1999).  
11. EU Decides to Begin Accession Negotiations with Turkey (2004) 
At the 2004 Brussels European Council, Member States agreed that ‘on the basis of a report and recommendation 
from the Commission that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open 
accession negotiations without delay’ (European Council, 2004). Between 1999 and 2004 both Turkey and the 
European Union had undergone significant changes. For the EU, the source of change was the run up to and the 
achievement of the 2004 enlargement. For Turkey, it was the 2002 elections and the coming to power of the Adalet 
ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, JDP) – a party set up by politicians who formerly belonged to 
the Milli Görüş (National Outlook) tradition of Turkey’s Islamist right – a tradition that never before had come to 
office as a single party government. 
In the run up to 2004, JDP policy-makers oscillated between representations of EU/rope as a booster of/hindrance 
against Turkey’s development (B2a/B2b) and EU/rope as a source of/solution to the risk of diplomatic isolation 
vis-à-vis the International Society (B1a/B1b). Both the political and economic insecurities were visible in the 
following statement by PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan:  
When enlargement is completed, the European Union will be the biggest economic and 
political bloc, which extends from the Atlantic Ocean to Russia and the Ukraine in the East 
and to Turkey in the Balkans, with a population of 600 million, complete with its integration 
on many levels, and achieved the customs union, single market, monetary and economic 
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union and finally a political union. We should ourselves the question: would it serve our 
interests to stay outside of this gigantic bloc? Are we going to wait and watch as many 
candidate counties, which are lagging behind Turkey in different areas, get ahead of Turkey 
through the benefits of membership, as in happened in the case of Greece? (Erdoğan, 2003). 
In this statement, Erdoğan represented EU/rope as a source of the risk of diplomatic isolation vis-à-vis the 
International Society. The example of Greece came up once again, and in a way similar to previous times – as 
contributing to the risk EU/rope constitutes in terms of Turkey’s diplomatic isolation.  
The issue of the economy was raised within the context of giving reassuring messages to the government’s 
detractors at home and abroad. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül highlighted the benefits both sides were to accrue 
from a favourable decision:  
The opening of negotiations with Turkey next year can only further improve the stability and 
international standing of our economy. As the EU is our major trade partner and foreign 
investor, full integration will further encourage the Turkish and European economies to 
merge. Turkish economy, with its dynamism and capacity will be an asset for Europe. Never 
a burden. Turkey is not after all taking a share from the European ‘cake’. Turkey herself will 
make this cake bigger. Our recent economic reforms and the recent performance of the 
Turkish economy is a proof of this dynamism and capacity (Gül, 2007, p. 278). 
Yet at the same time JDP policy-makers sought to de-emphasise the economic dimension:  
We surely would like to obtain the additional benefits of the EU to our economy. However, 
this is not the main dynamic, the main reason that drove us toward membership. Our main 
objective is to benefit from the combined development experience of the continent of Europe, 
and to enrich the colours of Europe by adding our own colour to them (Erdoğan, 2004a). 
As regards EU/rope as a community of values, just before the Brussels European Council, on 14 December 2004, 
PM Erdoğan (2004b) addressed JDP’s Parliamentary group meeting and made the point that it befell on EU/rope to 
prove that EU/rope is not rejecting of Turkey on cultural grounds (B3a/B3b). Foreign Minister Gül concurred: 
Turkey’s EU membership will mean that Europe has achieved such maturity that it can 
incorporate a major Muslim country into its fold. And that EU stands for common values and 
institutions rather than common religion. For Turkey, EU membership will mean anchoring 
more than a century old western vocation into the highest standards of democratisation, good 
governance and integration. For the world, this would evidence that civilizations line up in 
terms of their democratic vocation, and not on the basis of religion’ (Gül, 2007, p. 29). 
To recapitulate, the discourses of JDP policy-makers were structured around all three binaries. In particular, JDP 
policy makers oscillated between representing EU/rope as a source of and as a solution to the risk of diplomatic 
isolation vis-à-vis the International Society (B1a/b) and EU/rope as a community of values accepting/rejective of 
Turkey (B3a/b). In JDP policy-makers’ discourses, the risk of diplomatic isolation was represented as stemming 
from EU/rope being a community of values rejective of Turkey on cultural grounds. Rather than seeking to find a 
common civilizational ground (as Cem did in a previous era), JDP policy-makers’ discourses wrote Turkey out of 
EU/ropean civilization and sought commonality in the practice of dialogue of civilizations. In doing so, dialogue 
was also portrayed as one of the values EU/rope and Turkey shared among other political values. The point being, 
JDP governments picked up Cem’s civilizational rhetoric but with a significant difference. While Cem had sought 
to highlight how little sense it made to talk about EU/rope and Turkey as separate civilizations as if they did not 
have a shared history, the JDP adopted MP’s practice of writing Turkey out of EU/ropean civilization. Instead, they 
portrayed Turkey as an interlocutor of the Islamic civilization. 
12. Conclusion 
This article analyzed Turkey’s policy-makers’ understandings of EU/rope at nine critical moments in Turkey-EU 
relations from 1959 to 2004. Through focusing on policy-makers’ discourses we showed the persistence of 
ambivalence throughout the ups and downs of the relationship. Our analysis showed how their bearing toward 
EU/rope has been one of inspiration and anxiety all the same. In doing so, we have argued (contra the literature on 
Turkey-EU relations) that Turkey’s stance vis-à-vis EU/rope does not revolve around a single dichotomy (Turkey 
being European/not). Rather Turkey’s policy-makers’ discourses are structured around three binaries that are not in 
a dichotomous relationship. Turkey’s policy-makers have employed one, two or all three of these binaries 
throughout the history of the relationship. Hence the broader argument we make, tapping the insights of 
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Post-colonial Studies, that the notion of ambivalence best describes Turkey’s policy-makers’ stance vis-à-vis 
Europe. 
The table below traces the trajectory of Turkey’s policy-makers’ discourses on EU/rope as a source of inspiration 
and anxiety 1959 through 2004.  
 
Table 1. Three binaries in Turkey’s policy-makers’ discourses on Europe 
 B1 B2 B3 
a b a b a b 
1959  X X    
1963 X X     
1970 X  X X   
1978  X  X   
1987 X X   X  
1995  X   X  
1997  X   X X 
1999 X X   X  
2004 X X X X X X 
 
Our analysis of Turkey’s policy-makers’ discourses since 2004 reveal the persistence of ambivalence 
notwithstanding the beginning of accession negotiations. Since 2005, 17 out of 33 chapters have been negotiated. 
This hesitant progress in negotiations has been followed by policy-makers’ frequent representations EU/rope 
‘Christian Club’ excluding Turkey on cultural grounds. JDP policy-makers’ understanding of EU/rope have 
continued to reflect EU/rope as a community of values rejective of Turkey based on religion, but accepting of 
Turkey based on political values and economic benefit.  
Although it is problematic to trace linkages between policy-makers’ representations of EU/rope and public opinion, 
there clearly is a downward trend in public support for the EU since 2005 when JDP policy-makers began to 
frequently employ representations of EU/rope as a ‘Christian Club’, which aggravated insecurities as expressed by 
Turkey’s policy-makers (B1b and B3b). The following table illustrates the trends since 2001 when Eurobarometer 
opinion polls first included Turkey. 
 
Table 2. Eurobarometer surveys on public opinion in Turkey about the EU 
  Tendency to 
Trust in EU 
institutions 
Membership 
to the EU 









What the EU 
positively 
means 
2001 34% (tend to 
trust) 











2003 49% (tend to 
trust) 









2004 51% (tend to 
trust) 
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2005 41% (tend to 
trust) 














2007 25% (tend to 
trust) 





53% N/A N/A N/A 
2009 38% (tend to 
trust) 





46% N/A N/A Economy 
(Note 15) 
(33%) 
N/A: Not available (Note 16) 
Sources: The table is prepared based on the Eurobarometer surveys conducted in Turkey since 2001 following 
the acceptance of Turkey as an official candidate (Note 17). 
 
In conclusion, three observations are in order.  
 First, while economic insecurities have played an important role in the discourses of Turkey’s policy-makers 
in the early years of Turkey-EEC/EU relations, over the years they have been trumped by political 
insecurities. Even during the Customs Union negotiations of the 1990s, the government in office made the 
case to audiences at home and abroad less in economic and more in political terms. While representations of 
EU/rope as a booster of/hindrance against Turkey’s economic development seems to have made a comeback 
in the discourses of JDP policy-makers in the 2000s, the latter has insisted that the sources of their inspiration 
are rooted in EU/rope’s political achievements and less so in economic feat. This took place against the 
background of Turkey’s public opinion that seem to find the economy the most meaningful aspect of the EU 
(see table 2). 
 Second, whereas policy-makers until the mid-1980s sought to remedy their anxieties through joining what 
they considered to be the (Western) civilization (without distinguishing between its cultural and political 
dimensions) since the mid-1980s, they have increasingly written Turkey out of EU/ropean civilization and 
sought a political common ground. On the one hand, it is possible to consider this shift in policy-makers’ 
representations of EU/rope (from a community of values accepting of Turkey by virtue of shared civilisation, 
into a community of values rejective of Turkey in cultural terms but accepting of it in political terms) as a 
consequence of EU/ropean policy-makers’ own vacillations toward Turkey. On the other hand, the shift in 
policy-makers’ discourse from representing Turkey as belonging to Western (RPP and JP), s both Western 
and Islamic (MP, TPP and SDPP), an enmeshment of the two (DLP), to belonging to and offering oneself as 
the interlocutor of Islamic civilization (JDP) suggests that, Turkey’s policy-makers’ increasingly frequent 
attempts to seek a common ground in political but not cultural values have their roots in domestic politics and 
not only international relations. Considering the public opinion’s observations regarding the European 
project as ‘hope’ (see table 2), the public is yet to acknowledge MP and later JDP’s search for a common 
ground in political values.  
 Finally, through the JDP era, EU/rope has been represented in Turkey’s policy-makers’ discourse as a source 
of the risk of diplomatic isolation vis-à-vis the International Society. This finding is in contrast to those who 
have argued that security concerns of Turkey have diminished in relation to the EU/rope since JDP coming to 
power (Dağı, 2001). Non-military and non-specific insecurities continue to prevail in policy-makers’ 
discourses where EU/rope is represented as an ‘actor’ that has not so benign ‘designs’ regarding Turkey’s 
unity and territorial integrity.  
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Notes 
Note 1. Exceptions to this statement include McLaren and Müftüler-Baç’s(2003) survey of Turkish MPs. This 
study covers the period of 1999-2002 (the survey itself was conducted in April-May 2000) and focuses 
specifically on the MPs’ views on the European Union(see alsoTanıyıcı, 2010). Avcı’s(2004) analysis looks at 
Turkey’s political parties’ discourses on the EU in the post-Helsinki era. There are also Bora and Canefe(2002), 
Gülmez(2008), and Doğan(2005) offering analyses of specific political groups’ views on the EU. 
Note 2. We use the term ‘EU/rope’ to highlight how Turkey’s policy-makers’ discourses refer to Europe and the 
European Economic Community/Union interchangeably. 
Note 3. Republican leaders here refer to the founders of the Republic. 
Note 4. Not to forget significant parts of the Empire that came under British and French rule before, during or 
after WWI.  
Note 5. Capitulations were ‘granted’ by the Sultan in an earlier era when the Ottoman Empire was at the peak of 
its military power. In time, the power balance shifted between Ottoman Empire and its European counterparts. 
They were removed with the signing of the Lausanne Treaty.  
Note 6. The foregoing draws upon (Bilgin, 2009). 
Note 7. For a discussion of ‘non-military and non-specific’ insecurities within the European context, see 
(McSweeney, 1999). 
Note 8. Japanese and Chinese experiences with the International Society suggest that other responses were 
possible. See, for example, (Suzuki, 2005; Zhang, 1991). 
Note 9. (cited inKürkçüoğlu, 1980-1981, p. 138; also see Zürcher, 1993) 
Note 10. (Kürkçüoğlu, 1980-1981, pp. 138-139) 
Note 11. See ("Chronology of Turkey-European Relations (1959-2009)," 2009). 
Note 12. The primary sources we have analysed include government programs, public addresses and press 
statements by Presidents, Premiers and Ministers in office. We have collected these primary sources printed 
collections of official documents about Turkey-EU relations, the website of the Grand National Assembly, and 
printed collections of policy-makers’ speeches. Çayhan (1997) offers a collection of Grand National Assembly 
debates on Turkey-EEC/EU relations. We have also made use of memoirs and journalistic books of interviews 
with key actors, especially for earlier periods when policy-makers scarcely communicated with the public on 
foreign policy. We have also surveyed the centre-right daily Milliyet for press statements. Milliyet is the only 
newspaper that has made its archive starting from 1950 available online.  
Note 13. We extended the scope of our research to verify whether there were indeed so few statements about 
economic insecurity in this key moment. In addition to Milliyet, we surveyed the dailiesHürriyet, Sabah, Radikal, 
Cumhuriyet, and YeniYüzyıl.   
Note 14. In March 1997, following the European Christian Democrats Summit, Belgian PM stated that he 
considered the EU as a civilizational project and that Turkey culturally was not a part of it (Birand, 2000, p. 
465). 
Note 15. The sharp decline in economy as the most positive meaning in Turkey’s public opinion can partly be 
attributed to the recent global economic crisis. Financial problems of some EU Member States (Greece, Ireland, 
and Portugal) and questions about the future of Euro may have effected public perception in Turkey negatively. 
Note 16. In Eurobarometer surveys, some questions are not repeatedly asked in each survey. Not available (N/A) 
is included to mark the questions that are not asked in the relevant survey. 
Note 17. The surveys are: Eurobarometer, Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2001, Brussels, 2002; 
Eurobarometer, Public Opinion in the Candidate Countries, Brussels, 2003; Eurobarometer, Public Opinion in 
the European Union Country Report: Turkey, No: 62, Brussels, 2004; Eurobarometer, Public Opinion in the 
European Union Country Report: Turkey, No: 63.4, Brussels, 2005; Eurobarometer, Public Opinion in the 
European Union Country Report: Turkey, No: 68, Brussels, 2007; Eurobarometer, Public Opinion in the 
European Union Country Report: Turkey, No: 71, Brussels, 2009. 
 
